The return of geopolitics affirms the weight of political realism where all states seek to survive and endure under global disorder by capitalising on their power relative to other states and maximising security. An understanding about the changing nature of geopolitics is central to knowing the world geostrategic frame on which foreign policy of a state operates. Its destiny is shaped and articulated in an adaptation to a hierarchy of powers of a multi-polar system. The range and strength of their interactions underline the contours, nature and conduct of national leaders. Wise leaders set national priorities and carefully make distinctions among the nation’s varied interests to ward off crises spilling into the national space, keep the constitutional order robust and balance nationalistic ambition and global obligations. The gain, however, rests on the wisdom of leaders to navigate the state into multi-verse without incurring losses to self and know what its great powers perceive as its foreign policy course and devise their ensuing response. The Kautilyan geopolitical lesson beyond the canons of the Westphalian frame is very insightful. As a political realist outside the Atlantic scholarship, his geopolitical dictum entails to manage careful ties with the neighbours so that no one dictates its course and balances the interest of outside powers. His advice to the emperor Chandragupta is virtuous like Prithvi Narayan Shah’s wise counsel to his successors. Even Jung Bahadur Rana suggested the courtiers to respect local codes and manage local commons for the interest of people thus giving them an opportunity for self-development so that they are loyal to the state. The linkage The linkage of knowledge to interest, power, ideology and legitimacy is not new in world politics. The relativism of geopolitical theories, however, refuses certain aspects of locally evolved universal wisdom and its pattern of international relations. One example is tributary ties of small neighbours with the celestial Chinese empire. The other is Ashoka’s empire in the Indian subcontinent. Nepal’s self-evolution as an independent state between the two and adaptation during the era of imperial, colonial and state system can serve as a guide for its modern foreign policy conduct. It tells the government to decide its own policies, not dictated by the terms of aid, advice, investment and trade. Modern technology is eroding the iron rules of geography but not opening fully to the law-based order for states to cooperate in functional areas. Geopolitics is a power-driven game devoid of normative gaze. Now it has acquired a broader meaning, a weltanschauung, a wide-ranging worldview and the place of people within it waiting to be regulated by Hugo Grotius’s account of global norms, laws and institutions favourable to the dignity of even small states like Nepal. Modern geopolitics imbibes the bases of state power and its configurations in the global space for self-defence, security and prosperity. They impinge on the behaviour of states and leaders’ struggle for justice, legitimacy and peace. It retains a certain legacy of Cardinal Richelieu’s grand strategy of raison d’ etat of state politics in its anti-moralist and anti-legalist outfit and refuses the civic norms, laws and conventions mutually agreed for peaceful coexistence and remain coefficient. It is rooted in its autonomous capacity (not religious or class morality) of the state to pursue national interests, avert any crisis, adapt to an interconnected world and provide essential goods and services for its people for stability and progress. In geopolitics, skill, expertise, foresight and strength outweigh law and ethics. In this sense, the state’s reason for existence is justified in defending its own account of the national way of life. This is well articulated in Dibya Upadesh of Prithvi Narayan Shah. Neo-realist professor of international relations John J. Mearsheimer argues, “The keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of the individual states.” This means lackadaisical handling of geopolitics in a state of global volatility and power shifts subverts internal cohesion of state and unbinds the constellation of polity, economy and people in national space already pummelled by globalisation. Its process has decoupled the economy from democracy and denationalised national capital and labour. This view affirms the above remarks that foreign policy is not an extension of domestic policy. Internal peace does not mean a peaceful world. Nepali state must be able to coordinate antagonistic forces to avert external powers' entanglements in its domestic power struggle. Geopolitics sets the link between a nation’s geography and its strategy to organise the state’s spaces. The first is the heartland-capital city, Kathmandu, which is a decision-making centre. It specialises in politics to manage ecological, social, cultural and economic spheres, security and foreign policy for national sovereignty, survival and independence. The second is strategic zones central to defend and consolidate the heartland’s imperatives for progress and mobilise centripetal forces of society and resources for promoting national unity, progress and vital national interests. The third is buffer regions that control and neutralise the adverse cultural and ideological influence flowing from outside and manage resources so that the Nepali state can keep its major interests and historical, cultural and linguistic memory and national identity. Fourth is the nature of frontiers whose management is essential to protect and promote the peripheral interests of the state. This shows that the proper organization of the nation’s various geographical spaces is a vital strategy of internal stability and foreign policy of pro-active nonalignment. Professor Peter J. Taylor rightly argues, “Frontier is outward-oriented and boundary is inward-oriented” adding that “boundaries are the necessary components of sovereignty of territories” and that “sovereignty must be bounded: a world of sovereign states is a world divided by boundaries.” Nepal’s non-alignment is an ideal construction of foreign policy based on the principles of Panchsheel, the philosophy of Buddha. Its non-alignment is narrowly defined by restricting Nepal’s entry into military alliance but deem Gorkha recruitment and strategic partnership a symbol of friendship. It underlies the geopolitical necessity of survival between the protagonist powers, urgency to evade great powers’ competition to influence it, moral imperative to promote native values of golden mean and economic and political awakening about the need to diversify international relations beyond geographical determinism. Jumping on the bandwagon of global politics without building enough trust with neighbours can, however, easily fork national politics and drain its internal strength. Its oscillating policy on the rival initiatives of neighbours and the USA in the nation cannot make its nonalignment stout and sparkling. Two critical risks are in the offing: first, utilisation of external support for internal regime or government change has institutionalised foreign interests in national politics, and second, contradictory position of the same party in the government and in opposition thus fostering inconsistency in foreign policy. It does not create credibility of leaders and creditworthiness of the nation. Public awareness of foreign affairs has increased. The political worth of ideological proximity to India and the West marks a certain distance from China which immunes it from the irritations in bilateral ties. China finds Nepali state is weak and heavily permeated by internal interest groups and external forces through their soft power approach. China too, like the USA, speaks about Nepali sovereignty. Nepal, however, never remained far off from the gift of the Chinese civilisation, cultural exchanges and connectivity. Like India and the West, China now is interacting with many layers of Nepali society, not just the state-to-state and party-to-party relations. Now four issues have added Nepal’s geostrategic value aside from its geographic pivot and attracted the USA: endorsement of MCC and quasi execution of State Partnership Programme, participation in its democratic fraternity, official position in Venezuela and criticism of Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the later two issues it departed from the policies of both neighbours’ muted response. During her visit, US Deputy Secretary Victoria Jane Nuland made a sensible remark “Nepal should keep vigil in the protection of its sovereignty.” Nepal and India also participated in the global democratic summit organised by the US in defence of liberal order. Nepal’s constitutional, economic, political and educational systems are designed in the image of the policies of India and the West. Unlike India, however, Nepal is not a member of the QUAD and Indo-Pacific Strategy led by the USA despite the latter's lure. The former has always aspired to acquire global power status either by acquired muscle or on its own strength and indulging in China’s checkmate scheme; Nepal has a vaunted policy of not allowing its territory to be used by external powers against Chinese security interests even showed sensitivity to Indian willingness to set up a Buddhist college in Mustang. Despite opposition from India and the USA, Nepal joined the Belt and Road Initiative of China, undertook few projects under it and executed food security, poverty alleviation and epidemic control and reconstruction in remote areas under Global Development Initiative. Former President Bidya Bhandari participated in the webinar of the Global Security Initiative aimed to release what China calls positive energy for world peace and development. China has successfully mediated the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran and both sides agreed to open diplomatic relations and made efforts to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine. Unlike Russia-US relations, China’s ties with the USA, India and Russia are not mutually exclusive. Yet, their stalemated position has lent small states room for manoeuvre. Nonalignment In a multi-polar world of disorder, Nepali diplomacy must capture the utility of diverse actors beyond trinity of India, China and the USA and plan a scenario of real geopolitical trends affecting it especially Sino-Indian competition and conflict which disposed it to low key participation in Raisina Dialogue and Boao Forum for Asia, Indian interest in the US’s China containment strategy and US-China competition in Nepal, possible evolution of nonalignment in the future and conceivable shape of the global order to emerge. Great power competition for reasons of its strategic geography can offer it leverage if managed well Nonaligned movement is lawful, not lawless like geopolitics, the former is based on solidarity while the latter on subordination. The course of geopolitics is oriented to power struggle while the struggle of nonalignment is towards a vigilant sense of justice, mutual cooperation and peace. Its strategy is optimisation of interests in the golden mean. Nepal’s crucial virtues relative to other powers' interest and will are the claims for sovereign equality, autonomy in foreign policy, freedom of manoeuvre and alignment of the doctrine of non-alignment in practice. It is here the role of scholars in conceptualisation of foreign policy is important for Nepal so that it can evade ambiguity. (Former Reader at the Department of Political Science, TU, Dahal writes on political and social issues.)
MAY 24: The group - composed of Japan, the US, Australia and India - seems to be emerging from the shadows of the Covid-19 pandemic and, to some degree, from Russia's invasion of Ukraine as well.
The top leaders are gathering for the fourth time - they have already met once in Washington last September and twice virtually - in less than two years. That underscores the importance of the Quad, which was largely just a concept until 2017.
That year, then-US President Donald Trump revived the group in a bid to take on China in its own backyard.
But analysts say the steady decline in each Quad nation's bilateral ties with China in the past few years appears to have given it new impetus.
Michael Kugelman, deputy director at the Wilson Center think-tank, says the latest meeting is likely to sharply focus on the Indo-Pacific.
"With the pandemic in the rear-view mirror and an understanding over India's stand on Ukraine, the Quad will get down to focusing on its core business of ensuring an open and free Indo-Pacific," he says.
India has so far refused to directly criticise Russia over its war in Ukraine but it has reiterated the importance of respecting the sovereignty of each nation.India has so far refused to directly criticise Russia over its war in Ukraine but it has reiterated the importance of respecting the sovereignty of each nation.
After initial anger against India's stand, the US and other Western countries seem to have understood Delhi's position.
The 2+2 Dialogue - attended by the foreign and defence ministers of the US and India - in April helped smooth their differences over Ukraine.
The US has acknowledged that India's heavy dependence on Russia for its defence imports could not be overlooked.
So the Quad will focus on mutual points of convergence - and China is the biggest of these.
China has become increasingly assertive in the region, with ongoing maritime disputes with several countries and a land boundary conflict with India.
Beijing is investing heavily in strengthening its navy and its recent security pact with the Solomon Islands has stoked fears in Australia. A leaked draft of the agreement - which was verified by the Australian government - said Chinese warships would be permitted to dock on the islands and that Beijing could send security forces "to assist in maintaining social order".
It will be interesting to see how Anthony Albanese, Australia's newly elected PM, deals with this threat and how he raises the issue within the Quad framework.
Japan, for its part, has become increasingly wary of what it calls routine "incursions" from the Chinese navy.
As for the US, it is evident that it wants to protect its interests in the region.
The launch of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which has 13 regional players, is a step in that direction. It aims to promote regional growth, sustainability and inclusivity in the region.
It comes on the back of US President Joe Biden's recent meeting with the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) leaders in Washington.
The region's importance can be understood from the fact that it has some of the world's most heavily used shipping lanes, including the Strait of Malacca. Around 30-40% of the world's trade, including goods and crude oil, passes through these lanes.
So when Indian PM Narendra Modi, Mr Biden, Mr Albanese and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida meet in Tokyo, they may not mention China directly - but regional security will be on top of their agenda.
The Quad has several working groups, including on cybersecurity, health, infrastructure and education, but it has not explicitly spoken about any defence co-operation.
However, it's likely to announce a joint strategy to tackle illegal fishing in the Indo-Pacific region - which analysts say is largely aimed at China.
Mr Kugelman says this announcement would be quite significant because it involves the use of satellite imagery and active intelligence sharing - which will have security implications.
But he adds that the group will need to do a lot more before Asean nations see it as a major counterbalance to China.
It's not that there is no defence angle to the Quad. The four countries, and a few others, have taken part in India's Malabar naval exercises, and issues such as Afghanistan and North Korea's nuclear programme have been discussed at the Quad.
But Mr Kugelman points out that both Asean and Quad nations have significant trading volumes with China and they will try to avoid any direct confrontation with Beijing - at least until the Quad can emerge as a net security provider in the region.
Moreover, Delhi is a partner with Beijing in several multilateral forums, including Brics - which also includes Russia, South Africa and Brazil.
"The Quad has come a long way but it still has an informal structure and has no secretariat. So, it needs to keep evolving," Mr Kugelman says.
Meanwhile, Russia's growing ties with China will most likely feature as well as they don't suit Delhi's geopolitical calculations.
Some analysts have predicted that the Ukraine war may "send Russia into China's arms" and Beijing might be able to persuade Moscow to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific.
If that happens, it will upset Delhi's interests the most as it has close ties with Russia and an ongoing dispute with China.
It's just a scenario at the moment, Mr Kugelman says, but one that can't be completely overruled, especially since Russia has been quite critical of the Quad.
Beijing's initial reaction to the Quad was to dismiss it, saying the group would "dissipate like sea foam". But it later sharpened its criticism of the group, calling it the "Asian Nato".
On Sunday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the Quad was formed "to contain China".
With such hardening of positions from both sides, Asean nations - some of whom have active maritime disputes with China - may find themselves between what one analyst called "a rock and a hard place".
With inputs from BBC
The Belt and Road Initiative, first announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, has since developed into a global movement that is causing ripples around the globe. The BRI links three continents: Europe, Africa, and Asia via land and the Indian Ocean. Its major states are in South Asia, the intersection point where the continental "belt" meets the maritime "road," and it runs from Eurasia to Africa. Approximately 126 countries and 29 foreign organizations have signed 174 BRI partnership documents to date. Since the initiative's commencement in 2013, trade volumes between China and participating countries have surpassed $6 trillion, with over $80 billion invested. 300,000 new jobs have been generated. The Belt and Road Initiative looks to be a focus for the Chinese government in terms of creating strong international relationships and policy, rather than solely an economic venture. If accomplished, BRI transportation projects may cut travel times along economic corridors by 12%, improve commerce by 2.7 to 9.7%, raise income by up to 3.4 percent, and elevate 7.6 million people out of poverty.
China has emerged as a ray of hope for South Asian countries as a stable development partner to complement their development needs at a time when the global economy is slowing and Western donor funding is declining. This has gradually strengthened their economic relations with China, enabling them to continue to grow and expand.
South Asia has come out as a precedence area for BRI as South Asia is the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia includes four subprojects: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM), the Trans-Himalaya Corridor, and China’s cooperation with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives under the 21st century Maritime Silk Road. BRI’s most up-and-coming project—the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—runs through South Asia, and BRI’s most critical country, India, is also located in South Asia. This connection allows China to minimize its reliance on shipping via Singapore and the Melaka Straits, while Pakistan benefits from infrastructure and industrial growth, along with a telecommunications network.
During the 2015/16 Indian blockade, Nepal realized the importance of diversifying its commercial and transportation connectivity with China. The Memorandum of Understanding was described as the most significant effort in the history of bilateral ties, heralding a new era of cross-border connectivity between the two countries.
Under BRI, Nepal has been offered access to China's four major ports in order to minimize Nepal's excessive dependence on India. This effort is regarded as one of the most enthusiastic infrastructure undertakings ever devised. With such compelling potential, Nepal could not have stayed silent. Nepal formally joined the BRI on May 12, 2017, five years after its inception, adding another vital strand to the amicable ties between the two countries.
Both Nepal and China have identified nine projects: upgrading the Rasuwagadhi-Kathmandu road; construction of the Kimathanka-Hile road; road construction from Dipayal to the Chinese border; the Tokha-Bidur road; the Galchhi-Rasuwagadhi-Kerung 400kv transmission line; the Kerung-Kathmandu rail; the 762MW Tamor hydroelectricity project; the 426MW Phuket Karnali hydro. With all of these initiatives on the horizon, the necessity to complete these projects must be the primary strategy for attracting finance and technology.
Not only will state participation be vital for Nepal's overall development under the BRI concept of collaboration, but so will social involvement. To obtain significant benefits from BRI involvement, Nepal must solve local, geopolitical, and cultural issues. It will be critical to invest in ground-level projects targeted at improving the living standards of the people. Researching collaborative academic potential to construct a green inclusive corridor can be a necessary step in this approach.
Nepal should have issued a precise proposal outlining the percentage of costs it would bear and the sum of funds it anticipates from China in the form of grants or low-interest loans.
The MCC Truth
MCC is one of the greatest grants received by Nepal from any government or agency in its history. MCC grant is not in the best interest of Nepal because of the following reasons:
a) This agreement allows for the involvement of US military units in Nepal, resulting in a similar scenario to that of Afghanistan;
b) It undermines Nepal's sovereignty/integrity;
c) The US wants to fulfill its vested interest by requiring this agreement to be approved by the parliament; and
d) It needs Nepal to acquire explicit permission from India before implementing the project.
Also, Article 5.1 of the agreement also states that if the MCC fund is discovered to be utilized or employed for helping military and police activities in Nepal, the United States government has the power to terminate this agreement. MCC is a component of the United States' Indo-Pacific Strategy, which includes military components geared at opposing China, a friendly neighbor. According to the MCC agreement, it states that provisions in the compact will take precedence over Nepal's current laws in the event of a conflict, which requires parliamentary confirmation. The MCC is the first grant agreement that must be approved by Parliament which makes it more controversial.
Friends of Silk Road is a regional organization consisting of Bangladesh, Malaysia, Nepal and Pakistan, Thailand, Sri Lanka and others. The objective of the FOSR is to promote cooperation between the countries in various spheres including trade and investment and discuss issues such as economic development strategies and youth policies in different fields.
“Friends of Silk Road- Nepal '' is an initiative that brings people’s platform bringing together different segments of society. FOSR- Nepal started with representatives from communities, politicians, the media, commercial and opinion leaders, youth and women, professionals and civil society, learners and academics. The forum aimed to provide a deeper understanding as well as information about the advantages of the rewards of development and growth afforded by the multiple opportunities originating from the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.
China's BRI has already started to invest in smaller South Asian countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives while MCC is also targeting these same countries for infrastructure and networking initiatives. With a total population of 2.5 billion people, South Asia is a lucrative market to invest in and participate in. One-fifth of the South Asian population are youth aged between 14-24 years. Hence, BRI has tremendous economic potential in South Asia.
Nepal should commit to a non-alignment foreign policy, promote BRI, by protecting national interests by focusing on transparency and liability. It is prudent for Nepal to accept grants and Foreign Direct Investment, but only in key areas, in order to promote productivity, the environment, social coordination, employment, and long-term development.
Politicians and officials are concerned about what India will think if Nepal pursues the BRI projects. With geopolitical pressure mounting, the political leadership has remained hesitant to move the BRI forward. To move ahead, the Belt and Road Initiative necessitates a strong political will. Nepal must clearly define its goals in terms of which sectors take international loans, which accept only international grants, and which take soft loans or subsidized loans.
KATHMANDU, April 23: A new book titled "Mend or End" authored by Kathmandu-based Chinese journalist Zhou Shengping hit the stands on Thursday.
The book deals with various aspects of Nepali politics, economy, tourism and politics. It also covers matters pertaining to Nepal-China bilateral cooperation.
The book is a compilation of articles, features, interviews and travelogues reflecting Nepal's social and political life.
Nepali people had high hopes that their country would usher toward achieving goal of socio-economic development and prosperity after it promulgated the new constitution in 2015. It did not happen due to intra-party and inter-party conflicts even after the country witnessed the strongest government in the post-monarchy era. This post-war political scenario has also been explained well by Mr. Zhou.
Even as Nepali leaders often speak of transforming Nepal to Switzerland of Asia, the dream of achieving socio-economic development and prosperity with stable government has not been realized due to petty interests of leaders, the author observes. Another important point the author has mentioned that Nepali leaders often make lofty promises during elections and forget them once they reach in power. The author has also pointed out this particular tendency of Nepali leaders.
Covering Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit (October 2019) which was the highest high level visit from China to Nepal in two decades, the author argues that it opened up new vistas in bilateral ties between the two countries.
"This visit added a new chapter to friendly and cordial relationship between the two countries as the two countries agreed to elevate their ties to a strategic partnership of cooperation," the author observed.
The author quotes Chinese paramount leader late Mao Zedong as saying "10,000 years are too long, seize the day, seize the hour" and gives suggestions to Nepali leaders that its high time Nepal moved toward socio-economic development at a faster pace.
The author opines that Nepal can reap benefits from the rise of China and India and transform itself into a vibrant dynamic bridge if leaders work tirelessly.
The author also expresses concern over Nepali youths' exodus to foreign countries in search of job opportunities. "The surge in the remittance has been a major backbone of Nepali economy over the years. But what happens if that witnesses sudden disruption some day?" he puts a very genuine question.
The book is not just about the author's perspective toward Nepali politics and economy; he has also shared his personal experiences travelling to some places of Nepal like Mustang.
The piece is a collection of articles, news, features, analytical pieces, , interviews by Mr. Zhou which appeared in Chinese media outlets like Xinhua, Asia Pacific Daily Nepal edition and some Nepali media in the past nine years.
